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Abstract 
Since the ratification of the IEEE 802.11b standard in 1999, wireless LANs have become more prevalent. 
Today, wireless LANs are widely deployed in places such as corporate office conference rooms, industrial 
warehouses, Internet-ready classrooms, and even coffeehouses.These IEEE 802.11-based wireless LANs present 
new challenges for network administrators and information security administrators alike. Unlike the relative 
simplicity of wired Ethernet deployments, 802.11-based wireless LANs broadcast radio-frequency (RF) data for 
the client stations to hear.[2] This presents new and complex security issues that involve augmenting the 802.11 
standard. 
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1. Introduction 
Security in the IEEE 802.11 specification—
which applies to 802.11b, 802.11a, and 802.11g—
has come under intense scrutiny. Researchers have 
exposed several vulnerabilities in the authentication, 
data-privacy, and message-integrity mechanisms 
defined in the specification  
 
2. 802.11 Authentication and Its Weaknesse 
Wireless LANs, because of their broadcast 
nature, require the addition of[1]: 
a. User authentication to prevent unauthorized 
access to network resources 
b. Data privacy to protect the integrity and privacy 
of transmitted data 
 
The 802.11 specification stipulates two 
mechanisms for authenticating wireless LAN clients: 
open authentication and shared key authentication. 
Two other mechanisms—the Service Set Identifier 
(SSID) and authentication by client Media Access 
Control (MAC) address—are also commonly used. 
This section explains each approach and its 
weaknesses. 
The use of Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
keys can function as a type of access control because 
a client that lacks the correct WEP key cannot send 
data to or receive data from an access point. WEP, 
the encryption scheme adopted by the IEEE 802.11 
committee, provides encryption with 40 bits or 104 
bits of key strength. A subsequent section of this 
paper discusses WEP and its weaknesses in greater 
detail.  
 
2.1  Service Set Identifier 
The SSID is a construct that allows logical 
separation of wireless LANs. In general, a client 
must be configured with the appropriate SSID to 
gain access to the wireless LAN. The SSID does not 
provide any data-privacy functions, nor does it truly 
authenticate the client to the access point. 
 
2.2  802.11 Station Authentication 
Authentication in the 802.11 specification is 
based on authenticating a wireless station or device 
instead of authenticating a user. The specification 
provides for two modes of authentication: open 
authentication and shared key authentication. 
The 802.11 client authentication process 
consists of the following transactions (Figure 1): 
1.  Client broadcasts a probe request frame on every 
channel 
2.  Access points within range respond with a probe 
response frame 
3.  The client decides which access point (AP) is the 
best for access and sends an authentication 
request 
4.  The access point will send an authentication reply 
5. Upon successful authentication, the client will 
send an association request frame to the access 
point 
6.  The access point will reply with an association 
response 
7.  The client is now able to pass traffic to the access 
point 
 
Figure 1. 802.11 Client Authentication Process 
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2.2.1 Probe Requests and Responses 
Sinnce the client becomes active on the 
medium, it searches for access points in radio range 
using the 802.11 management frames known as 
probe request frames. The probe request frame is 
sent on every channel the client supports in an 
attempt to find all access points in range that match 
the SSID and client-requested data rates (Figure 2). 
All access points that are in range and match 
the probe request criteria will respond with a probe 
response frame containing synchronization 
information and access point load. The client can 
determine which access point to associate to by 
weighing the supported data rates and access point 
load. Once the client determines the optimal access 
point to connect to, it moves to the authentication 
phase of 802.11 network access. 
 
 
Figure 2. Probe Request Frame 
 
Open authentication allows any device 
network access. If no encryption is enabled on the 
network, any device that knows the SSID of the 
access point can gain access to the network. With 
WEP encryption enabled on an access point, the 
WEP key itself becomes a means of access control. 
If a device does not have the correct WEP key, even 
though authentication is successful, the device will 
be unable to transmit data through the access point. 
Neither can it decrypt data sent from the access point 
(Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Open Authentication with Differing WEP 
Keys 
 
2.2.3  Shared Key Authentication 
Shared key authentication is the second mode 
of authentication specified in the 802.11 standard. 
Shared key authentication requires that the client 
configure a static WEP key. Figure 46 describes the 
shared key authentication process. 
1.  The client sends an authentication request to the 
access point requesting shared key authentication 
2.  The access point responds with an authentication 
response containing challenge text 
3.  The client uses its locally configured WEP key to 
encrypt the challenge text and reply with a 
subsequent authentication request 
4.  If the access point can decrypt the authentication 
request and retrieve the original challenge text, 
then it responds with an authentication response 
that grants the client access 
 
Figure 4. Shared Key Authentication Process 
 
2.2.4  MAC Address Authentication 
The SSID is advertised in plain-text in the 
access point beacon messages (Figure 8). Although 
beacon messages are transparent to users, an 
eavesdropper can easily determine the SSID with the 
use of an 802.11 wireless LAN packet analyzer, like 
Sniffer Pro. Some access-point vendors, including 
Cisco, offer the option to disable SSID broadcasts in 
the beacon messages. The SSID can still be 
determined by sniffing the probe response frames 
from an access point (Figure 9). 
The SSID is not designed, nor intended for 
use, as a security mechanism. In addition, disabling 
SSID broadcasts might have adverse effects on Wi-
Fi interoperability for mixed-client deployments. 
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Therefore, Cisco does not recommend using the 
SSID as a mode of security [3]. 
 
 
Figure 5. SSID in an Access Point Beacon Frame 
 
 
Figure 6. Wi-Fi Listener in Netstumbler 
 
2.3.2  Open Authentication Vulnerabilities 
Open authentication provides no way for the 
access point to determine whether a client is valid. 
This is a major security vulnerability if WEP 
encryption is not implemented in a wireless LAN. 
Cisco does not recommend deploying wireless 
LANs without WEP encryption. In scenarios in 
which WEP encryption is not needed or is not 
feasible to deploy, such as public wireless LAN 
deployments strong, higher-layer authentication can 
be provided by implementing a Service Selection 
Gateway (SSG). 
 
2.3.3  Shared Key Authentication Vulnerablitis 
Shared key authentication requires the client 
use a preshared WEP key to encrypt challenge text 
sent from the access point. The access point 
authenticates the client by decrypting the shared key 
response and validating that the challenge text is the 
same. 
The process of exchanging the challenge text 
occurs over the wireless link and is vulnerable to a 
man-in-the-middle attack. An eavesdropper can 
capture both the plain-text challenge text and the 
cipher-text response. WEP encryption is done by 
performing an exclusive OR (XOR) function on the 
plain-text with the key stream to produce the cipher-
text. It is important to note that if the XOR function 
is performed on the plain-text and cipher-text are 
XORed, the result is the key stream. Therefore, an 
eavesdropper can easily derive the key stream just 
by sniffing the shared key authentication process 
with a protocol analyzer (Figure 7). 
 
2.3.4 MAC Address Authentication 
Vulnerabilities 
MAC addresses are sent in the clear as 
required by the 802.11 specification. As a result, in 
wireless LANs that use MAC authentication, a 
network attacker might be able to subvert the MAC 
authentication process by "spoofing" a valid MAC 
address. 
MAC address spoofing is possible in 802.11 
network interface cards (NICs) that allow the 
universally administered address (UAA) to be 
overwritten with a locally administered address 
(LAA). A network attacker can use a protocol 
analyzer to determine a valid MAC address in the 
business support system (BSS) and an LAA-
compliant NIC with which to spoof the valid MAC 
address. 
 
 
Figure 7. Vulnerability of Shared Key 
Authentication 
 
3.  WEP Encryption and Its Weaknesses 
frWEP is based on the RC4 algorithm, which 
is a symmetric key stream cipher. As noted 
previously, the encryption keys must match on both 
the client and the access point for frame exchanges 
to succeed. The following section will examine 
stream ciphers and provide some perspective on how 
they work and how they compare to block ciphers. 
 
3.1  Stream Ciphers and Block Ciphers 
A stream cipher encrypts data by generating a 
key stream from the key and performing the XOR 
function on the key stream with the plain-text data. 
The key stream can be any size necessary to match 
the size of the plain-text frame to encrypt (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Stream Cipher Operation 
 
Block ciphers deal with data in defined 
blocks, rather than frames of varying sizes. The 
block cipher fragments the frame into blocks of 
predetermined size and performs the XOR function 
on each block. Each block must be the 
predetermined size, and leftover frame fragments are 
padded to the appropriate block size (Figure 9). For 
example, if a block cipher fragments frames into 16 
byte blocks, and a 38-byte frame is to be encrypted, 
the block cipher fragments the frame into two 16-
byte blocks and one six-byte block. The six-byte 
block is padded with 10 bytes of padding to meet the 
16-byte block size. 
 
 
Figure 9. Block Cipher Operation 
 
The process of encryption described above 
for stream ciphers and block ciphers is known as 
Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode encryption. With 
ECB mode encryption, the same plain-text input 
always generates the same cipher-text output. As 
Figure 10 illustrates, the input text of "FOO" always 
produces the same cipher-text. This is a potential 
security threat because eavesdroppers can see 
patterns in the cipher-text and start making educated 
guesses about what the original plain-text is. 
 
 
Figure 10. Electronic Code Book Encryption 
 
There are two encryption techniques to 
overcome this issue: Initialization vectors and 
Feedback modes 
 
3.1.1  Initialization Vectors 
An initialization vector (IV) is used to alter 
the key stream. The IV is a numeric value that is 
concatenated to the base key before the key stream is 
generated. Every time the IV changes, so does the 
key stream. Figure 11 shows the same plain-text 
"FOO" with the XOR function performed with the 
IV augmented key stream to generate different 
cipher-text. The 802.11 standard recommends that 
the IV change on a per-frame basis. This way, if the 
same packet is transmitted twice, the resulting 
cipher-text will be different for each transmission 
The IV is a 24-bit value (Figure 11) that 
augments a 40-bit WEP key to 64 bits and a 104-bit 
WEP key to 128 bits. The IV is sent in the clear in 
the frame header so the receiving station knows the 
IV value and is able to decrypt the frame (Figure 
12). Although 40-bit and 104-bit WEP keys are 
often referred to as 64-bit and 128-bit WEP keys, the 
effective key strength is only 40 bits and 104 bits, 
respectively, because the IV is sent unencrypted. 
 
 
Figure 11. Encryption with an Initialization Vector 
 
 
Figure 12. Initialization Vector in a WEP-Encrypted 
Frame 
 
 
Figure 12. Initialization Vector in an 802.11 
Protocol Decode 
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3.1.2  Feedback Modes 
Feedback modes are modifications to the 
encryption process to prevent a plain-text message 
from generating the same cipher-text during 
encryption. Feedback modes are generally used with 
block ciphers, and the most common feedback mode 
is known as cipher block chaining (CBC) mode. 
The premise behind CBC mode is that a 
plain-text block has the XOR function performed 
with the previous block of cipher-text. Because the 
first block has no preceding cipher-text block, an IV 
is used to change the key stream.  
 
3.2  Statistical Key Derivation—Passive Network 
Attacks 
An August 2001, cryptanalysts Fluhrer, 
Mantin, and Shamir determined that a WEP key 
could be derived by passively collecting particular 
frames from a wireless LAN. The vulnerability is 
how WEP has implemented the key scheduling 
algorithm (KSA) from the RC4 stream cipher. 
Several IVs (referred to as weak IVs) can reveal key 
bytes after statistical analysis. Researchers at 
AT&T/Rice University as well as the developers of 
the AirSnort application implemented this 
vulnerability and verified that WEP keys of either 
40- or 128-bit key length can be derived after as few 
as 4 million frames. For high-usage wireless LANs, 
this translates to roughly four hours until a 128-bit 
WEP key is derived. 
This vulnerability renders WEP ineffective. 
Using dynamic WEP keys can mitigate this 
vulnerability, but reactive efforts only mitigate 
known issues. To eliminate this vulnerability, a 
mechanism that strengthens the WEP key is 
required. 
 
3.3 Inductive Key Derivation—Active Network 
Attacks 
Inductive key derivation is the process of 
deriving a key by coercing information from the 
wireless LAN and is also referred to as an active 
network attack. As mentioned in the section on 
stream ciphers, encryption is accomplished by 
performing the XOR function with the stream cipher 
to produce the cipher-text. Inductive network attacks 
work on this premise.Man-in-the-middle attacks, a 
form of inductive key derivation attack, are effective 
in 802.11 networks because of the lack of effective 
message integrity. The receiver of a frame cannot 
verify that the frame was not tampered with during 
its transmission. In addition, the Integrity Check 
Value (ICV) used to provide message integrity is 
based on the 32-bit cyclic redundancy check 
(CRC32) checksum function. The CRC32 value is 
vulnerable to bit-flipping attacks, which render it 
ineffective. With no effective mechanism to verify 
message integrity, wireless LANs are vulnerable to 
man-in-the-middle attacks, which include bit-
flipping attacks and IV replay attacks.[8] 
 
3.3.1  Initialization Vector Replay Attacks 
The initialization vector (IV) replay attack is 
a network attack that has been practically 
implemented, not just theorized. Although various 
forms of the network attack exist, the one that 
clearly illustrates its inductive nature is described 
below and illustrated in Figure 14: 
1. A known plain-text message is sent to an 
observable wireless LAN client (an e-mail 
message) 
2.  The network attacker will sniff the wireless LAN 
looking for the predicted cipher-text 
3.  The network attacker will find the known frame 
and derive the key stream 
4.  The network attacker can "grow" the key stream 
using the same IV/WEP key pair as the observed 
frame 
 
This attack is based on the knowledge that 
the IV and base WEP key can be reused or replayed 
repeatedly to generate a key stream large enough to 
subvert the network. 
Once a key stream has been derived for a 
given frame size, it can be "grown" to any size 
required. This process is described below and 
illustrated in Figure 15: 
1.  The network attacker can build a frame one byte 
larger than the known key stream size; an 
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo 
frame is ideal because the access point solicits a 
response 
2. The network attacker then augments the key 
stream by one byte 
3. The additional byte is guessed because only 256 
possible values are possible 
4. When the network attacker guesses the correct 
value, the expected response is received: in this 
example, the ICMP echo reply message 
5. The process is repeated until the desired key 
stream length is obtained. 
 
 
Figure 14. Initialization Vector Reuse Vulnerability 
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Figure 15. "Growing" a Key Stream 
 
3.3.2  Bit-Flipping Attacks 
Bit-flipping attacks have the same goal as IV 
replay attacks, but they rely on the weakness of the 
ICV. Although the data payload size may vary, 
many elements remain constant and in the same bit 
position. The attacker will tamper with the payload 
portion of the frame to modify the higher layer 
packet. The process for a bit-flipping attack is listed 
below and in Figure16: 
1.   The attacker sniffs a frame on the wireless LAN 
2.   The attacker captures the frame and flips random 
bits in the data payload of the frame 
3.   The attacker modifies the ICV (detailed later) 
4.   The attacker transmits the modified frame 
5.  The receiver (either a client or the access point) 
receives the frame and calculates the ICV based 
on the frame contents 
6. The receiver compares the calculated ICV with 
the value in the ICV field of the frame 
7.   The receiver accepts the modified frame 
8. The receiver de-encapsulates the frame and 
processes the Layer 3 packet 
9.  Because bits are flipped in the layer packet, the 
Layer 3 checksum fails 
10. The receiver IP stack generates a predictable 
error 
11. The attacker sniffs the wireless LAN looking for 
the encrypted error message 
12. Upon receiving the error message, the attacker 
derives the key stream as with the IV replay 
attack. 
 
Figure 17. Bit-Flipping Attack 
 
The basis for this attack is the failure of the 
ICV. The ICV is in the WEP-encrypted portion of 
the frame, so how is the attacker able to modify it to 
match the bit-flipped changes to the frame? The 
process of flipping bits is: 
1.   A given frame (F1 in Figure 18) has an ICV (C1) 
2.   A new frame is generated (F2) the same length 
as F1 with bits set 
3.   Frame F3 is created by performing the XOR 
function F1 and F2 
4.   The ICV for F3 is calculated (C2) 
5.   ICV C3 is generated by performing the XOR 
function C1 and C2. 
 
 
Figure 18. Bit flipping attack resolve 
 
3.4  Static WEP Key Management Issues 
The 802.11 standard does not specify key 
management mechanisms. WEP is defined to 
support only static, preshared keys. Because 802.11 
authentication authenticates a device and not the 
user of the device, the loss or theft of a wireless 
adapter becomes a security issue for the network. 
The loss of an adapter and the compromising of the 
existing key presents network administrators with 
the tedious task of manually rekeying all wireless 
devices in the network. 
This task might be acceptable for small 
deployments but is not realistic in midsize and large 
deployments in which the number of wireless users 
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can reach into the thousands. Without a mechanism 
to distribute or generate keys, administrators must 
watch wireless NICs closely. 
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